In this paper, I try to demonstrate a problem with two medieval European views of existence: The property view and the essence view. Adopting a style of reasoning employed by the Indian Madhyamaka philosopher Nāgārjuna, I argue that both the property view and the essence view understand the relation between an object and its existence in terms of difference: The former understands the difference as the difference between an object and its property of existence, and the latter, as the difference (...) between an object’s essence and existence. Neither understanding is without problems, and both lack explanatory power. We must reject both the views. (shrink)

Semantychnyĭ prostir movy -- Odvichni zapytanni︠a︡ -- Pereklady. Martin Haĭdegger. Hans Georg Gadamer. Gabrielʹ Marselʹ.

Originally published in 1952, this book forms the second of two volumes based on the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1919 and 1921. The first volume, Mind and Matter, was originally published in 1931. The text provides a philosophical discussion of the nature and limits of knowledge, examining the relationship between mind and the conception of a universal truth. Essential to this discussion is the idea of the part as being inconceivable in the absence of a (...) totalising wholeness of being. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy, psychology and theories of knowledge. (shrink)

In this work we analyze the case of resistive conductor plates carrying constant currents, utilizing surface charge distributions. We obtain the electric potential in the plates and in the space surrounding them. We obtain a non-vanishing electric field outside the conductors. We compare the theoretical results with experimental data present in the literature.

Mind uploading speculation and debate often concludes that a procedure described as gradual in-place replacement preserves personal identity while a procedure described as destructive scan-and-copy produces some other identity in the target substrate such that personal identity is lost along with the biological brain. This paper demonstrates a chain of reasoning that establishes metaphysical equivalence between these two methods in terms of preserving personal identity.